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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
LEIGH FURNITURE AND CARPET 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
T. RICHARD ISOM, dba RICHARD'S 
FINE FURNISHINGS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
* * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 17,264 
The defendant T. Richard Isom by way of a Counterclaim against 
the Plaintiff Leigh Furniture & Carpet Company asserted that the 
Plaintiff tortiously breached the contractual relationship existing 
between the plaintiff and the defendant and interferred with 
defendant's business relationship. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a directed 
verdict. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant 
against the plaintiff for $65,000.00 general damages and $35,000 in 
Punitive damages. Plaintiff's Motion for Judgr.1ent Notwithstanding 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the Verdict and Motion for New Trial were denied. However, the 
Court granted a remittitur of $22,000.00 on the award of punitive 
damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff Leigh Furniture & Carpet Company seeks to have the 
judgment of the lower court reversed, and judgment entered in favor 
of plaintiff and against the defendant, or in the alternative, be 
granted a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, as the Seller and defendant as the purchaser entereci, 
into an "Agreement" dated May 14, 1970, wherein defendant sought to 
acquire the assets of a retail furniture business located in St. 
George, Utah. (R. p. 4) In addition the defendant leased from t~ 
plaintiff a portion of the building where plaintiff had previously 
conducted a retail furniture business. Furthermore, the "Agreement" 
granted to the defendant a conditional option to purchase the 
entire building. This "Agreement" is the focal point of the case 
and was prepared for the parties by Mr. Orville Isom, father of the 
defendant and legal counsel for the plaintiff. 
Shortly following the execution of the "Agreement" disputes 
arose between the parties principally because of the interpretation 
of the "Agreement". A temporary resolution of the parties' disputa· 
tions was achieved when the parties executed a supplemental 
"Agreement" dated September 28, 1972. (Exhibit No. 3). The primary 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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functions of the latter "Agreement" were to reduce the principal 
balance of the original contract, provide a means whereby defendant 
could solicit plaintiff's approval of a potential sale or transfer 
of the business then being conducted by the defendant, provide a 
means for obtaining financial records, and to solidify defendant's 
liability to the plaintiff for taxes paid by the plaintiff. At the 
time the supplemental agreement was signed in 1972 two lawsuits 
were pending concerning interpretation of the original "Agreement" 
and the parties agreed that those issues should be submitted to the 
court. 
Little, if any contact occurred between the parties following 
the September 28, 1972 "Agreement" until the summer of 1974, when 
defendant's counsel commenced solicitation of the plaintiff per-
taining to potential investors who were purportly interested in 
investing in defendant's business. The solicitation was instigated 
because of the unprofitability of the defendant's business. Although 
plaintiff approved of several of defendant's solicitations (Tr. 
p. 518-542), and disapproved of others (Tr. p. 542), defendant's 
solicitations eventially centered upon one individual -- Brent 
Talbot. Mr. Talbot, however, repeatedly denied any interest in the 
defendant's business and so informed agents of the plaintiff. (Tr. 
p. 561-580). 
Believing its security to be in jeopardy and believing that 
defendant was in default in performing the provisions of the ~ay 
14, 1970 "Agreement" plaintiff filed a Complaint with the District 
Court seeking a terrnina tion of the defendant's interest in the 
--
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Agreement" or in the alternative an audit of defendant's financial 
condition. (R. p. 1-8). Following the filing of the Complaint t~ 
defendant notified the plaintiff that the sum of $27,000.00 was 
being deposited with an escrow as payment of the balance of the 
"Agreement," and said sum was available for the plaintiff upon 
plaintiff's agreement to the conditions of such tender. Plaintiff 
refused the conditions of the offer. 
A hearing on plaintiff's petition for injunctive relief was 
heard by the Court before Judge Burns. Both plaintiff and defendant 
were present and represented by counsel. Following the receipt of 
evidence and arguments the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff 
granting plaintiff's contractual right to an audit of defendant's 
business and providing certain safegaurds to the defendant. (R. p. 
15-a). The audit was undertaken by Mr. Rod Savage, CPA (which, 
incidently, produced several major discrepancies between the state-
ments prepared by the defendant and actual audited figures. See 
Savage testimony Tr. pp. 583-605) but before the same was concluded' 
the defendant filed bankruptcy on April 4, 1975 (R. p. 20). 
Defendant's bankruptcy schedules showed him, and hence his business, 
to be substantially insolvent. (Tr. p. 595-596). 
Following defendant's discharge in bankruptcy in April of 1977 
the defendant filed a motion to amend his answer to the plaintiff's 
Complaint and to file a Counterclaim. (R. p. 22). Furthermore, 
the defendant sought to impress a trust upon the real estate des-
cribed in the 1970 "Agreement". (R. p. 29) With reference to th~ 
effort plaintiff filed a Motion for partial Summary Judgment. (R. 
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p. 31) . The Court again took evidence and heard arguments from the 
parties and granted plaintiff's motion (R. p. 45), finding that if 
defendant had any interest in the real estate under the contract he 
could seek it through money damages. After this, nothing happened 
in the case for over 18 months. 
Prior to trial plaintiff presented an oral motion in limine to 
seek the Court's interpretation of defendant's theory under his 
Counterclaim. The Court ruled that defendant's action was in tort 
and not for tortious breach of contract and ruled that evidence 
concerning breach of contract was not relevant to the case. Not-
withstanding such a ruling the case was tried and submitted to the 
jury substantially, if not wholly, upon evidence purportedly sus-
taining a breach of contract rather than a tort. 
The plaintiff, believing that defendant was in default of the 
~rms and conditions of the "Agreement" filed its action for breach 
of contract and admitted at trial that it desired a change. However, 
filing the lawsuit to seek judicial determination of its claims was 
the only action plaintiff took. Defendant maintained that such 
action together with other alleged actions tortiously interferred 
1·1ith his contractual and business relations but did not identify one 
party whom plaintiff interferred with to defendant's detriment. 
(Tr. p. 420-421). 
ABSTRACT OF WITNESSES 
The following is a short synopsis of the testimony of the 
Witnesses called by both plaintiff and defendant at trial including 
L -5-
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the pages in the trahscript where such testimony can be found. 
1. Orville Isom 
a) Direct: Transcript pp. 88-171. Preliminary disc~~· 
with plaintiff re sale of St. George Store; that defendant 
wanted to move back to Utah; Agreement drawn up to sell to 
Richard individually; descriptions of the lease provisions; 
discussion of who was to pay the obligations of the Company 
after January 1, 1970; discussions of Richard's difficulties 
with the business; desire of Richard to sell the building; di~ 
cussion of the audit; Leigh told Orville to bring Brent 
Talbot into business. Mr. Leigh didn't want Hayes Hunter as 
an investor in the business; description of the supplemental 
agreement dated September 28, 1972; discussion of first law-
suits filed by Leigh against Richard, suit by Moss against 
Leigh and Richard for furnace repair; discussion of letter ~ 
Howe re bringing Talbot into business; Leigh's statement that 
he must have been crazy to get involved in this 10 year lease; 
Leigh said he would not okay Brent Talbot; appraisal of the 
St. George property; Orville's surprise at Leigh's suit seeki~ 
an audit. 
bl Cross-Exam: Transcript pp. 171-231. Orville's 
desire initially to withdraw; exclusion from the sale of 
Laney's property; Orville's assurances that Laney would be 
paid in stock; Orville's acknowledgement of a moral obligation 
to pay Laney, but admissions that Laney was never paid in 
fact; Orville's loans of $27,000.00 to the business; discussioo 
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of Richard's lack of expertise and need to bring someone into 
the business; security interest of Leigh Furniture Co.; 
Orville did not include an escalator clause in the agreement; 
Orville did not know of or include in the agreement provisions 
to take care of Laney; Orville admits he told Leigh he would 
take care of Laney through cash payments; Orville got permission 
to bring in Graf & Hence; discussion of Talbot being brought 
in, Orville maintained Talbot said he wanted to come in; 
Talbot to become lessee of entire building; rent never in 
arrears two months; Orville familiar with the Company's financial 
condition. 
c) Re-Direct: Transcript pp. 231-262. Richard not two 
months in arrears on lease payments as Complaint alleges; 
monthly financial statements were supplied; Mr. Talbot not 
interested in coming into the business; discussion of Leigh's 
obligation to pay portion of rent and utility bills, and 
Leigh's default in such payments. 
d) Re-Cross: Transcript pp. 262-266. The May 14th 
agreement was still to be performed. 
2. Mr. Clark Houston. 
a) Direct: Transcript pp. 266-274. Mr. Houston's 
appraisal of the property; property worth $133,000.00 encumbered 
by Leigh's leasehold interest (vs. $175,000.00 free of that 
interest). 
b) Cross-Exam: Transcript pp. 274-277. Both Leigh and 
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the pages in the transcript where such testimony can be found. 
1. Orville Isom 
a) Direct: Transcript pp. 88-171. Preliminary discussi: 
with plaintiff re sale of St. George Store; that defendant 
wanted to move back to Utah; Agreement drawn up to sell to 
Richard individually; descriptions of the lease provisions; 
discussion of who was to pay the obligations of the Company 
after January 1, 1970; discussions of Richard's difficulties 
with the business; desire of Richard to sell the building; dis-
cussion of the audit; Leigh told Orville to bring Brent 
Talbot into business. Mr. Leigh didn't want Hayes Hunter as 
an investor in the business; description of the supplemental 
agreement dated September 28, 1972; discussion of first law-
suits filed by Leigh against Richard, suit by Moss against 
Leigh and Richard for furnace repair; discussion of letter ~ 
Howe re bringing Talbot into business; Leigh's statement that 
he must have been crazy to get involved in this 10 year lease; 
Leigh said he would not okay Brent Talbot; appraisal of the 
St. George property; Orville's surprise at Leigh's suit seekino 
an audit. 
b) Cross-Exam: Transcript pp. 171-231. Orville's 
desire initially to withdraw; exclusion from the sale of 
Laney's property; Orville's assurances that Laney would be 
paid in stock; Orville• s acknowledgement of a moral obligation 
to pay Laney, but admissions that Laney was never paid in 
fact; Orville's loans of $27,000.00 to the business; discussioi 
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of Richard's lack of expertise and need to bring someone into 
the business; security interest of Leigh Furniture Co.; 
Orville did not include an escalator clause in the agreement; 
Orville did not know of or include in the agreement provisions 
to take care of Laney; Orville admits he told Leigh he would 
take care of Laney through cash payments; Orville got permission 
to bring in Graf & Hence; discussion of Talbot being brought 
in, Orville maintained Talbot said he wanted to come in; 
Talbot to become lessee of entire building; rent never in 
arrears two months; Orville familiar with the Company's financial 
condition. 
c) Re-Direct: Transcript pp. 231-262. Richard not two 
months in arrears on lease payments as Complaint alleges; 
monthly financial statements were supplied; Mr. Talbot not 
interested in coming into the business; discussion of Leigh's 
obligation to pay portion of rent and utility bills, and 
Leigh's default in such payments. 
d) Re-Cross: Transcript pp. 262-266. The May 14th 
agreement was still to be performed. 
2. Mr. Clark Houston. 
a) Direct: Transcript pp. 266-274. Mr. Houston's 
appraisal of the property; property worth $133,000.00 encumbered 
by Leigh's leasehold interest (vs. $175,000.00 free of that 
interest). 
b) Cross-Exam: Transcript pp. 274-277. Both Leigh and 
_J 
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Isom knew of Houston's appraisals; Houston accepted employment 
by Isom, too, although he was employed by Leigh. 
c) Re-Direct Exam: Transcript pp. 277-278. The 
value of the leasehold interest is $45, 000. 00 vs. the $42, ooo.r 
previously testified to. 
3. Frank K. Stuart 
a) Direct: Transcript pp. 278-279. (Expert witness on 
business and economic expectancies). 
4. Mr. T. Richard Isom 
a) Direct: Transcript pp. 280-285. Richard's tax 
returns accurate to best of his knowledge but later admitted 
the financial statements were incorrect. 
5. Mr. Frank K. Stuart 
a) Direct: Transcript pp. 285-314. Discussion of 
methods appraisers use to estimate a firm's value; certain 
assumptions and hypothetical questions posed to Mr. Stuart; 
as an expert Mr. Stuart had never valued a retail establish-
ment in Southern Utah. 
b) Cross-Exam: Transcript pp. 314-322. Stuart did not' 
take account of inventory in valuation; Stuart did not consider. 
entire entrepreneurial capacity of Richard Isom in his valuath 
6. Mr. T. Richard Isom 
a) Re-Direct: Transcript pp. 323-330. Richard quit 
job in Seattle that paid more than his job with the store in 
St. George; but he came back to St. George because that's 
where he wanted to live; discussion re Richard's buying of the 
business. 
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7. Mr. Garn Huskinson 
a) Direct: Transcript pp. 331-353. Mr. Huskinson 
priced the inventory, and bank balances as part of his audit 
of Richard's fine furnishings. 
8. T. Richard Isom 
a) Re-Direct: Transcript pp. 354-405. Richard knowingly 
entered into the lease; when Richard took over the business he 
cut expenses and concentrated on sales; began having problems 
of interpretation of contract within a year after contract was 
signed; problems with the furnace, waterheater; Leigh came to 
store and complained of not getting financial statements; Mr. 
Leigh was hos.tile to Isom; such hostility would "wring Isom 
out"; Richard began sending quarterly reports when he found 
out he was supposed to under the Contract; Mrs. Leigh also had 
a demoralizing effect on the operation of the business by 
asking Richard questions; Richard let a friend stay above the 
business, but denies it was subletting; the Laney lawsuit came 
up during Richard's Christmas season; Richard was beginning to 
make a profit with the ultimate intention of buying the 
business; Richard made lease payments through 1974; Richard 
paid utility bills by deducting them from the rent checks; 
Richard raised the $27,000.00 to buy out Leigh contingent on 
certain terms, but then learned of complaint filed by Leigh; 
Richard filed bankruptcy; Richard tried to get Applegate ~n 
the business; Leigh never responded to his request to bring 
Applegate in. 
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b) Cross' Exam: Transcript pp. 405-458. It was Mr. 
Hayfen's fault that Leigh didn't get financial statements; 
Richard felt no need to replace sewing machines, despite such 
a provision in the contract; Richard agreed with Orville to 
"take care of" Laney; but Laney refused their attempts; Ric~~ 
admits he never paid Laney; Ashdown & Mrs. Leigh visited 
Richard "many, many times"; Leigh et al demand things not 
required in the contract; Richard filed bankruptcy solely 
because of Leigh's actions; decision to close doors was 
Richard's; Richard admits he was under obligation to replace 
inventory; the $27,000.00 was put in the bank, with conditioos 
that Leigh must fulfill to get it. 
c) Re-Direct: Transcript pp. 458-468. Richard would 
not have closed the business without the many complaints. 
d) Re-Cross Exam: Transcript p. 468. Conflict between 
inventory amounts on balance sheet and on bankruptcy petition. I 
9. Eldon Ashdown 
a) Direct: Transcript pp. 476-481. The only reason 
Ashdown ocassionally saw Isom was to get him to bring his 
account up to date; Ashdown never made threats to Isom, never 
harrassed him. 
b) Cross Exam: Transcript pp. 481-489. Ashdown never 
went into the store to interrupt Isom or harrass him; never 
interrupted him when he was with customers. 
10. Mrs. Grace Leigh 
a) Direct: Transcript pp. 489-492. Mrs. Leigh never 
I 
_.-
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talked lo Richard on any trip to St. George in 1972; she 
never threatened him either. 
b) Cross Exam: Transcript pp. 492-496. Purpose of 
going to St. George was to take care of Leigh's 17 apts.; 
Mrs. Leigh never went into the store on her visits to St. 
George. 
11. Mr. William S. Leigh 
a) Direct Exam: Transcript pp. 496-523. Mr. Leigh agreed 
not to go int_o the store for 3-1/2 months after Richard took 
over; He was only in Utah 4 or 5 days during 1971; maybe the 
same in 1970; there was no problem with the furnace before, 
when it was properly taken care of; the lawsuit over the 
furnace was brought because it was Richard's obligation to pay 
for the furnace; he told Richard it was a breach of contract 
to shut off the parking lot the way he had done. 
b) Cross Exam: Transcript pp. 523-553. Orville told 
Leigh to stay away from Richard and the store; Leigh had 
little contact with Richard after that; Leigh was ocassionaly 
on the store property to deal with his apartments; Leigh told 
Richard he would contact people in California about selling 
them the business if Richard didn't live up to the terms of 
the contract; Leigh did tell Richard that he would "cancel him 
out" if he didn't live up to terms of the lease agreement, but 
only because Richard was not keeping up his end of the agree-
ment; Mr. Leigh didn't approve of Hayes Hunter to come into 
the business. 
-11-
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12. Brent Talbot 
a) Direct Exam: Transcript pp. 553-569. Mr. Talbot 
was not interested in Mr. Isom's offers from him to come into 
the business; he never told Leigh that he was interested in 
going into the business. 
b) Cross Exam: Transcript pp. 569-583. Mr. Talbot at 
no time encouraged Mr. Isom into thinking he (Mr. Talbot) 
would ever be interested in coming into the business. 
13. Ron Savage 
a) Direct Exam: Transcript pp. 583-596. No January 
31, 1975 balance sheet was ever prepared by the business; the 
February 28th balance sheet was not prepared until April 4, 
1975. 
b) Cross Exam: Transcript pp. 596-603. Richard was 
very responsive and cooperative regarding the audits. 
c) Re-Direct: pp. 603-604. 
REBUTTAL EXAM 
14. Richard Isom 
a) Rebuttal Exam: Transcript pp. 605-609. Mr. Isom 
had no liquidation sale in 1975; Mr. Talbot had conversations 
indicating he might come into the business. 
b) Cross-Exam on Rebuttal: Transcript pp. 609-610. 
c) Re-Direct Exam on Rebuttal: Transcript pp. Gl0-611. 
Isom sustained loss ever since "things" with Leigh began. 
15. Mr. Orville Isom 
a) Direct Rebuttal Exam: Transcript pp. 611-616. orvi.' 
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I 
and Talbot went to Premises (store) to discuss Talbot's corning 
into the business; Talbot mentioned that if he were going to 
buy part of the business, he would like to look at the vacant 
apts; Talbot also went all through the store to look at it; 
SUMJ1ARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the right of every person in society to enter contracts 
for any lawful purpose. Correlative to that right is the duty of the 
parties once they enter the contract to fulfill their obligations 
thereunder and uphold their ends of the bargain. As a protection 
and enforcer of these rights and duties it is the right of contract-
ing parties to enforce their contracts by appeal for redress to the 
courts. 
But when parties seek to enforce their claims in court they 
must follow established rules of procedure and state a precise 
claim upon which relief can be granted. If a party chooses, for 
example, to plead his/her case in contract instead of properly 
pleading it in tort, and yet refuses to plead the tort remedy in 
the alternative so as to cover all possible bases of relief, he/ 
she assumes the risk that his/her single claim will fail and that 
~/she will be left without the remedy sought. The same rule 
applies to the person who pleads in tort a claim that should be 
Plead in contract as was done by the defendant in the case at bar. 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling and the defendant's plea 
in.his counterclaim, the law of torts has not expanded to_cover 
.. 
..-__ 
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breach of contract actions. Hence, permitting recovery in this 
case for a claim based in tort which ought properly to be plead in 
contract, if indeed there is even a basis for such a plea, is 
wholly improper and must not be allowed by this court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BASED UPON ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 'THAT A 
PARTY TO A CONTRACT CANNOT HIMSELF TORTIOUSLY INTER-
FERE THEREWITH, DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFF 
TORTIOUSLY INTERFERRED WITH DEFENDANT'S CONTRACTUAL 
OR BUSINESS RELATIONS MUST FAIL FOR LACK OF A 
SHOWING THAT THERE EXISTED A THIRD PARTY CONTRACT 
In pre-trial hearings, defendant attempted to clarify the 
nature of his counterclaim and to specify that it was an action in 
tort for interference with his contractual or business relations. 
The Common law historical origin of this tort, as well as modern 
expert treatises -and case law demonstrate that the tort of interfer· 
I ence with contractual or business relations requires that the 
interferer be a third party, a stranger to the contract or business I 
relations. Indeed, defendant's claimed cause of action here is 
nothing more than a breach of contract action erroneously and 
misleadingly clothed in the form of a tort. Such a confused claim 
must be denied by this Court. 
A. The Tort of Interference With Contractual or 
Business Relations Requires That The Contract 
Upon Which The Action Is Based Be With A 
Third Party. 
The tort of interference with contractual or business rel,ations 
developed at common law as a remedy for those whose contracts had 
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been breached as a result of outside inducement. The Court in 
Stauffer v. Frec1cricksbur~ada, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D.Va. 
1976) explains its origin: 
The essence of the tort here in question is 
interference with contractual relations. Its origin 
is the Queens Bench decision of Lumley v. Gye, 2 EL. 
S. BL. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749. (l953) In that famous 
case a competitor had induced opera star Johanna 
Wagner to breach her·contract to perform for 
plaintiff. The Court held that, as between con-
tracting parties, the contract itself provided a 
sufficient remedy. To compensate for the wrong 
done by the non-contracting party in inducing 
bre>ach of contract, however, the Court felt a 
tort action was required. Hence, consistent with 
the reasoning behind the origin of this action 
the law has developed that 'the defendant's 
breach of his own contract with plaintiff is, of 
course, not the basis of the tort.'" Id. at 
1138, citing Prosser, The Law of Torts-;-§129 at 
p. 934 (4th ed. 1971). 
Thus, the origin of this tort was meant to provide a method by 
which an action could be brought against the interferring third 
party. A breach of contract action was thought to be a sufficient 
remedy for the contracting parties themselves. Consistent with 
this common law origin, current case law in America has developed 
and refined the essential elements of this tort. As stated by the 
Court in Carmen v. Heber, 601 P.2d 646 (Colo. App. 1979), they are: 
(1) The existence of a contract between the plaintiff and 
a third pi'.rty; (2) Knowledge by the defendant of this 
contract or knowledge of facts which would lead him to 
inquire as to the existence of the contract; (3) Intent 
by the defendant to induce a breach of contract with a 
third party; (4) Action by the defendant which induces a 
breach of the contract; and (5) Damages to the plaintiff. 
Id. at 647; Sec also Comtrol, Inc. v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 32 Colo. App. 384, 513 P.2d 
1082 (1973). 
_, c;_ 
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In the instant case, defendant Isom has failed to prove or 
even allege the existence of a third-party contract or substantial 
business relations with which plaintiff Leigh tortiously interfern( 
Indeed, no such contract existed here, let alone plaintiff Leigh's 
knowledge of such a contract. Furthermore, most courts hold, as 
the Carmen elements require, that the interference be intentional. 
Mere negligent interference is not enough. See Prosser, supra at 
934; Chanay v. Chittenden, 115 Ariz. 32, 563 P.2d 287 (1977). 
The Restatement of Torts (Second) has summarized this tort in 
three sections, all three of which call for an existing or prospec-1 
tive relationship with a person other than the alleged tortfeasor: 
§766. Intentional Interference with Performance of 
Contract by Third Person. 
One who intentionally and improperly interferes 
with the performance of a contract (except a 
contract to marry) between another and a third 
person by inducing or otherwise causing the third 
person not to perform the contract, is subject 
to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss 
resulting to the other from the failure of the 
third person to perform the contract. 
§766A. Intentional Interference with Another's Performance 
of His Own Contract. 
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with 
the performance of a contract (except a contract to 
marry) between another and a third person, by 
preventing the other from performing the contract 
or causing his performance to be more expensive or ~• 
burdensome, is subject to liability to the other 
for the pecuniary loss resulting to him. 
§766B. Intentional Interference with Prospective 
Contractual Relation. 
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One who intentionally and improperly interferes 
with another's prospective contractual relation 
(except a contract to marry) is subject to lia-
bility to the other for the pecuniary harm 
resulting from loss of the benefits of the 
relation, whether the interference consists of: 
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third 
person not to enter into or continue 
the prospective relation or 
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or 
continuing the prospective relation. 
The Restatement of Torts (First) §766 contains a similar 
provision: 
[O]ne who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise 
purposely causes a third person not to 
a) perform a contract with another, or 
b) enter into or continue a business relation with 
another 
is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby. 
In Olson v. Scholes, 17 Wash. App. 383, 563 P.2d 1275 (1977) 
the court cites this latter section of the Restatement and then 
interprets it in light of a claim by plaintiff landlord of tortious 
interference with contractual or business relations by defendant 
lessees: 
The tort as defined in the Restatement is divided 
into two parts: (a) dealing with the cause of 
action arising when a third person induces a breach 
of contract and (b) dealing with the cause of 
action which arises when a third person induces one 
person not to enter into a contract with another. 
The first subdivision deals with present relation-
ships, and the second with future relationships. 
563 P.2d at 1279. 
The Court then cites the necessary elements of this tort 
theory, elements similar to those already cited in Carmen v. Heber, 
unu states: 
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However, this theory does not apply to actions 
where the contest i~ between parties to an exist-
ing contract. The cause of action ex~sts only 
against outsiders who interfere with contractual 
relationships or business expectancies of others. 
A landlord-tenant relationship existed between 
the plaintiff and the defendants when the claimed 
tortious acts occurred, and therefore, any right 
to redress cannot be based upon the tort theory 
of business interference. If the plaintiff is to 
recover, his cause of action must arise from the 
violation or breach of the contractual relation-
ship. Id. at 1280. [Emphasis added.] 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming recently adopted the 
same elements cited in Carmen and Olson as being necessary pre-
requisites to maintenance of a claim based on the tort theory of 
interference with contractual or business relations, but stated 
specifically that, "These theories . . . do not apply to actions 
between parties to an existing contract -- they lie only against 
outsiders who interfere with the contractual expectancies of others, 
Board of Trustees, Etc. v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009, 1017 (Wyo. 1978). 
[Emphasis the Court's.] 
The Law in this area is so settled that an inordinate recitatio: 
of further decisions would border on redundancy. Hence, to avoid ex'j 
I 
only a few of the significant recent decisions which have developed 
1 
I 
this tort will be cited. 
In the case of Hein v. Chrysler, 45 Wash. 2d 586, 277 P.2d 708 
(1954), the plaintiff, a former automobile dealer, brought suit 
against Chrysler, an automobile manufacturer. Plaintiff maint0ined 
that his action was for tortious interference with business generan 
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Jnd not just for malicious inducement of breach of contractual 
relations and hence would lie against a party to a contract. The 
court rejected this distinction, for every item of damage sought by 
the plaintiff arose from the alleged breach of the contract by 
Chrysler to supply automobiles. Consequently the court stated: 
We must hold that appellant cannot recover in tort 
against Chrysler for two reasons: (1) Chrysler is 
not a third party but is one of the two parties to 
the contract, the breach of which it is charged with 
inducing, and hence cannot be liable for inducing 
itself to breach the contract, and (2) an injured 
party in the position of appellant (assuming that 
the contract did bind Chrysler to deliver the 
forty-five cars) is entitled to recover in his 
breach of contract actions all of the damages 
wl1ich normally and naturally can be expected to 
flow from such breach. [citations omitted]. Where 
the breach of contract must necessarily cause damage 
to, or the destruction of, the business of the other 
contracting party, the damages for such harm to, or 
destruction of, his business may be fully recovered by 
the injured party in his breach of contract action. 
277 P.2d at 715. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court recently made a similar holding in 
Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1979). In Kvenild plaintiff 
entered an agreement with defendants Kvenild and Barrett, defendant 
Kvenild being the broker through whom Barrett's house was offered 
for sale to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs took possession of Barrett's 
house after having paid a small amount of earnest money, and promised 
defendants that they would soon obtain sufficient funding for a 
~wn payment. Plaintiffs' plans were frustrated and they did not 
obtain enough money for the down payment. Defendant Barrett waited 
as long as she possibly could for plaintiffs to meet the requirements 
for closing the sale, but they never did. Defendant Kvenild, the 
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realtor, sold the house to a third party, an action which gave ri~ 
to plaintiff's suing in tort for interference with the contract 
between them and defendants. The Court cited the rule laid down in 
Holso and then said: 
Under the above cited-rule, Barrett [defendant] cannot 
be held liable for tortious interference with the 
contract because she was a party to the contract she 
is alleged to have interferred with. The defendants 
[Kvenild] cannot be held liable either because they 
stood in a relationship of responsibility to Barrett. 
They were not strangers to the contract. . We hold 
that there was no evidence to sustain that necessary 
element of a claim of tortious interference with a 
contract. 594 P.2d at 977. 
Similarly, in Houser v. City of Redmond, 91 Wash. 2d 36, 
586 P.2d 482 (1978) the Washington Supreme Court held that, "Recover. 
for tortious interference with a contractual relation requires ~~ 
the interferer be an intermeddling third party; a party to a contrac 
cannot be held liable in tort for interference with that contract." 
586 P. 2d at 484. And just last year that same court in Olympic Fish 
Products, Inc. v. Lloyd, 93 Wash. 2d 596, 611 P.2d 737 (1980), ~~ 
that, "An action for tortious interference with a contractual relati'' 
ship lies only against a third party. A party to the contract 
cannot be liable in tort for inducing its own breach." 611 P. 2d at 
738. 
The Federal Courts have made similar rulings when confronted 
facts to which such holdings would apply. In Allison v. American 
Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Okla, 1953), the Court, applying t~ 
law of Oklahoma said, "[A]lthough an employer may be guilty of 
breaching its contract, it cannot be guilty of 'inducing"' the 
-?!\-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
breJch of its own contract; Id. at 38. And in Canister Co. 
v. National Can Corp., 96 F. Supp. 273 (D. Del. 1951) the plaintiff 
alle<Jcd that: 
(D]efcndant voluntarily, deliberately and maliciously 
breached its agreements with plaintiff, and is contin-
uing so to do, with the purpose and intent of injuring, 
damaging, or even destroying plaintiff's business and 
good will to the end that defendant, either alone or 
with others acting in concert with defendant, may 
thereby, in large measure, acquire plaintiff's customers 
and business, and consequently profit more largely 
than through the faithful performance of its 
agreements with plaintiff. Id. 
The court ruled that the plaintiffs' claim was for breach of contract, 
for which suit had already been brought, and that an action for 
inducing breach of contract would not lie against a party to the 
contract for inducing himself to commit a breach of that contract 
or for conspiring to breach it. Id. at 274. 
Thus, the law is clear that for the tort theory of interference 
with contractual or business relations to succeed, the interference 
must be by a third-party stranger to the contract. Since no third-
party contract existed here, plaintiff Leigh could not possibly 
have interfered with such a third- party contract, and hence, 
defendant's counterclaim based on this tort theory must necessarily 
fail. Consequently, the trial court erred in its conclusion that a 
party to a contract can tortiously interfere with his own contract 
or business. 
Moreover, defendant in his counterclaim makes the claim that 
Plaintiff Leigh intentionally wilfully and maliciously harass~d 
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defenuant and tried to force him out of qusiness. Yet the dcfcndar, 
when asked during the trial to identify those actions by the 
plaintiff or his agents that interferred with his contractual or 
business relations, could not do so. Indeed, the primary reason 
for defendant's business problems was not any interference by 
plaintiff, but defendant's lack of working capital. At trial, 
defendant put it this way: 
Q: And do you contend that Eldon Ashdown and Grace Leigh 
made it di.fficult for you to do business at this 
particular time? 
A: It would hamper it to a degree. I cannot establish 
Q: Do you know of any business that you lost by virtue of 
them coming down there and making visits in 1974? 
A: The knowledge of this would be strictly hearsay from 
customers. 
Q: Richard, isn't it true that you perceived that you were 
having financial difficulties with the business in late 
1974? 
A: I had a lack of working capital and that was my primary 
problem. 
Q: When did you first realize that injust [sic] position of 
the year 1974? When you first came to the realization 
that you had that problem? 
A: I did that in the fall of 1972, I realized t~at when 
I had gone out and -- I raised $20,000.00 to put in --
Q: Now, that's not responsive to my question. I said in 
1974 when did you first realize that you had problems 
with capitalization for your business? 
A: The first day of 1974. 
Q: Is it correct that you realized that was a problem througi' 
your operation of the store; is that not correct? 
A: Yes, it was a lack of working capital. (Tr. 420-421). 
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Thus, not only did defendant admit that a lack of working capital 
was the major reason for the breakdown of the business, but defendant 
also could not identify any business at all which was lost because of 
plaintiff's or his a gen ts' so-called "interference." Hence, there 
was not here any third-party contract with which plaintiff could have 
interferred, and not one identifiable instance of any loss of business 
because of plaintiff's alleged interference. Defendant's claims are 
therefore wholly without merit. 
B. Defendant's Cluim Amounts to Nothing More Than a 
Breach of Contract Action Erroneously and Mislead-
ingly Plead In The Form of a Tort Action. 
Defendant Isom has been ambivalent at best regarding the character 
of his claim. Even the trial court was confused regarding the exact 
nature of defendant's counterclaim. Notwithstanding the court's 
utimatc ruling, the trial judge was confused regarding defendant's 
"hybRidization" of the tort and contract claim, and desired that 
defendant make an election between the two: 
I conceptually have real problems in riding the 
rail between the two of them, and jumping to one 
side and then the other side as may suit convenience. 
I would think that you would have to make an elec-
tion, Mr. Nielsen, as to whether you're suing in 
contract or in tort. Now, if you decide that you're 
suing in tort then the thought that a contract did 
exist between the parties may be relevant to show 
the jury as furnishing the background and it may 
be relevant in several ways to the existance [sic], 
but the duty -- source of the duty that's violated 
would have to sound in tort rather than from the 
contract. If, however, it's a contract action, if 
yon're alleging breach of the contract then there 
are other implications that arise from that fact, 
and I don't think I can intelligently rule on objec-
tions during the trial. I don't think that the two 
-23-
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of you can! make opening statements really, unless that 
election is made, unless there's something in the 
law that I don't know about that involves a Hybrid 
Cause of Action. (Tr. p. 43). 
Thus, the court was confused and asked the defendant to clarH. 
his position and make an election between the two causes of acti~. 
If he had plead breach of contract, then at least the legal reqci~ 
ments for the claim would exist and the factual determination could 
then be properly made by the trier of fact based upon an accurate 
understanding of thd legal claim. But instead, defendant chose ~ 
couch his claim in the form of a tort, a tort claim which in this 
case amounts to nothing more than a breach of contract action. Suci, 
a method by claimants has been strictly condemned by the courts. r 
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
applying Pennsylvania law stated it this way: 
[P]laintiff's claim of interference with contract rela-
tions must fail in that the law . . is clear that a 
promiser cannot sue his promisee or vice versa for 
interference with the plaintiff's business relation-
ship with third parties where the claimed interference 
amounts to nothing more than a breach of the contract. 
Sherman v. Weber Dental Manufacturing Co., 285 F. Supp. 
114, 116 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
Similarily, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted the necessittl 
avoiding the confusion that can be caused by pleading in tort actio::. 
that really are nothing more than contract actions. In Glazer v. 
Chandler, 414 Pa. 304, 200 A.2d 416 (1964), the Court reversed a 
decision in plaintiff's favor wherein the plaintiff claimed tortioui, 
interference with contractual relations. The Court in thus holding. 
stated: 
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The tort of inducing breach of contract or refusal to 
deal is defined as inducing or otherwise causing a 
third person not to perform a contract with another, 
or not to enter into or continue a business relation 
with another, without a privilege to do so. Numerous 
cases in this Commonwealth are in accord with this 
definition. 
Every case in Pennsylvania granting recovery for 
this tort has involved a defendant's interference 
with known contracts or business relations existing 
between third persons and a plaintiff. · 
* * * 
However, where, as in this case, the allegations 
and evidence only disclose that defendant breached his 
contracts with plaintiff and that as an incidental 
consequence thereof plaintiff's business relationships 
with third parties have been affected, an action lies 
only in contract for defendant's breaches, and the 
consequential damages recoverable, if any, may be 
adjudicated only in that action. 
To permit a promisee to sue his promisor in 
tort for breaches of contract inter se would erode 
the usual rules of contractual recovery and inject 
confusion into our well-settled forms of actions. 
Most courts have been cautious about permiting tort 
recovery for contractual breaches and we are in 
full accord with this policy. [Citation omitted.] 
The methods of proof and the damages recoverable 
in actions for breach of contract are well established 
and need not be embellished by new procedures or 
new concepts which might tend to confuse both the bar 
and litigants." 200 A.2d at 418. 
In the instant case, the damages claimed by the defendant for 
loss of business, interest in real property and damage to reputation 
are claimed to be the result of the alleged conduct of plaintiff in 
llireatening to cancel the contract, seeking new purchasers, and 
refusing defendant's tender of payment. Such allegations are breach 
of contract allegations, i.e., breach of an implied obligation under 
-25-
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the contract not to prevent or hinder the performance of the contra, 
by the other party. See Orton v. Embassy Realty Associates, 91 Cal.' 
App. 2d 434, 205 P.2d 427 (1949); Corbin on Contracts §947 (1 Vol.. 
1952). 
Thus, this court's tolerance of defendant's categorization of~ 
claim as a tort would only serve to confuse the Law of Torts in thL 
state. To avoid that confusion, this Court is respectfully request•. 
to overturn the trial court's ruling which is indeed a confused ved 
of the Law of Torts. 
II. EVEN ASSUMING L~RGUENDO THAT DEFENDANT ISOM COULD 
BRING AN ACTION IN TORT FOR PLAINTIFF'S INTERFER-
ENCE WITH HIS OWN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS WITH 
DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF'S ACTIONS WERE PRIVILEGED 
AND HE WAS FULLY JUSTIFIED IN TAKING SUCH ACTIONS. 
This Court has recognized that actions which are privileged do· 
not constitute the basis for breach of contract. In Gammon v. 
Federated Milk Producers Ass'n., Inc., 11 Utah 2d 421, 360P.2d101 
(1961), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "Ordinarily, there is no 
liability for procuring a breach of contract where the breach is 
caused by the exercise of an absolute right -- that is, an act whid 
a person has a definite legal right to do without any qualificat~m' 
360 P.2d at 1022. Thus, if a defendant has a legal right or justiH 
cation for taking certain actions, he is said to have a privilege 
which will limit his liability if his actions tend to produce what , 
otherwise could be characterized as interference in contractual or 
business relations. 
-26- 1 
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A discussion of' this privilege, of course, assumes that in the 
case at bar, defendant Isom has some sort of cause of action against 
the plaintiff in the first instance. Assuming that such an action 
could be brought, plaintiff would be left with the defense of 
"Justification" or that its actions were privileged, a defense 
formulated to defend the actions of third-party interferors. Never-
theless, proceeding on the assumption that defendant has a cause of 
action, plaintiff would have to defend on the basis that its actions 
were privileged. The Supreme Court of Washington in Cherberg v. 
Peoples National Bank of Washington, 88 Wash. 2d 595, 564 P.2d 1137 
(1977) , outlined such a privilege and the factors which give rise 
to it: 
(I]n some instances, intentional interference with a 
business expectancy may be "privileged" and therefore, 
not a basis for tort recovery. A privilege to interfere 
may be established if the interferor's conduct is deemed 
justifiable, considering such factors as: the nature 
of the interferor's conduct; the character of the 
expectancy with which the conduct interferes; the 
relationship between the various parties; the interest 
sought to be advanced by the interferor; and the social 
desirability of protecting the expectancy of the inter-
feror 's freedom of action. 564 P.2d at 1143-1144. 
[Citations omitted.] See also Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65 
Wash. 2d 157, 396 P.2dl48(T964). 
Thus, a determination of whether plaintiff's actions were 
privileged is a factual determination based on such factors as the 
nature of his conduct, his relationship with defendant and the 
interest he was attempting to protect. Once those factors are 
established an interferor's conduct, considering such factors, 
must be show·n to have been unreasonable under the circumstances. As 
stated in Basin Elec. Power Co-op., v. Howton, 603 P.2d 402 
(Wyo. 1979), "The term justification is broad and the question of 
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whether there was an unjustified interference depends upon the fac· 
of each case. However, as we stated in Wartensleben, 415 P. 2d 611' 
'we still must concern ourselves with a determination as to whetl~ 
defendants were reasonably justified in doing what they did .... 
603 P.2d at 404-405. [Emphasis the Court's] . Thus, an inteferor'•' 
actions must be "reasonably justified" or, as the Basin Court goes 
on to say, the key factor which gives rise to the privilege to 
interfere is that the interferer act in "good faith". 603 P.2d ~ 
405. 
Prosser has gone so far as to modify this good faith requirerrt· 
and state that even the existence of some ill-will cannot defeat U, 
privilege if the interferer's actions were justified in the first 
instance: 
Since Lumley v. Gye there h~s been general agreement tl~ 
a purely "malicious" motive, in the sense of spite and 
a desire to do harm to the plaintiff for its own sake, 
will make the defendant liable for interference with a 
contract. The same is true of mere officious intermed-
dling for no other reason than a desire to interfere. 
On the other hand, in the few cases in which the 
question has arisen, it has been held that where the 
defendant has a proper purpose in view, the addition 
of ill will toward the plaintiff will not defeat the 
privilege. It may be suggested that here, as in the 
case of mixed motives in the exercise of a privilege 
in defamation and malicious prosecution, the court may 
well look to the predominant purpose underlying the 
defendant's conduct. Prosser, §129 at 943. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Thus, if plaintiff Leigh's predominant purpose in taking the 
actions he did against the defendant (and in particular the filiM 
of the Complaint for breach of contract) was proper, his privilege 
-28- I 
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to take such actions will not be negated even by the existence of 
some ill-will. Indeed, an inference could be drawn that plaintiff 
had some ill-will toward defendant, but such was only aroused when 
clefcndant refused to comply with the terms of the contract. Plaintiff 
stated such on cross-examination: 
Q: Isn't it true, Mr. Leigh, that you had contacted Mr. 
Orville Isom about what you might do to sell the 
property and he told you that you would have to sell 
it subject to the lease? 
A: I knew that already. 
Q: You knew that already? 
A: Sure. 
Q: And so, you were trying to get rid of the lease at 
this time so you could sell the property in a package? 
A: I was trying to get Richard to keep up his agreement 
and portions of the lease. 
Q: Now, the last paragraph says, "I trust you will come up 
with something that would be satisfactory for both of 
us if you are still interested." Now, did you ever, 
after the signing of the supplemental agreement in 
September of 1971 [sic] ever write another letter to 
Richard Isom making a demand on him to live up to 
the terms of the contract? 
* * * 
I will ask you, Mr. Leigh, if at any time after 
September 28th, 1972, that you ever wrote a demand 
letter to Richard Isom telling him that if he didn't 
live up to the contract, that you were going to 
cancel him out? 
A: That could be. 
Q: Do you have any such document that you have? 
A: No. r don't know of it, but I could have. 
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Q: Now, in this letter you did tell him that you were 
going to cancel him out, didn't you? 
A: That's right. (Tr. p. 538-539). 
Plaintiff's ill-will then, indeed if any existed was merely a 
function of his frustration over defendant's refusal to keep the 
terms of the contract. And the reason he filed the lawsuit was 
only to seek an audit which would demonstrate that his breach of 
contract claims were correct. The Complaint only sought the oppor· 
tunity to take a complete physical inventory and audit of the 
business (R. pp. 2-3), an opportunity guaranteed the plaintiff ~ 
the lease. It would thus be folly to contend that plaintiff was n0 
justified in taking the actions he did. He was acting to protect 
his own financial interest and property, an interest which he in 
good faith sought to protect in the first instance when the lea~~ 
formed. He fully performed his obligations and was seeking only to 
obtain defendant's performance or, if such was not obtainable, to 
exercise his right to terminate the agreement. The agreement on 
which plaintiff Leigh had relied for protection provided: 
Time is of the essence of this purchase agreement and 
lease and in the event of a default in any payment 
provided for herein, or a default in the performance 
of any other condition herein set forth and for 60 
days after said payment or performance is due, the 
seller may at its option, cancel and terminate this 
agreement and lease and be relieved of all obliga-
tions of performance and all payments theretofore 
made shall be forfeited as liquidated damages and the 
seller shall be entitled to the immediate possession 
of the merchandise and property herein agreed to be 
sold and also shall be entitled to the possession 
of the real property herein leased and the purchaser 
will surrender the property to the seller. (R. PP· 
7-8). 
I 
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aut in spite of· the lease, plaintiff's interests were threatened 
because of defendant's continued violation of several lease provisions, 
which violations were admitted by defendant, including being 
delinquent in making pay1nents on the lease, selling fixed assets not 
~rt of inventory without replacing them, and failing to keep the 
i1w8ntory, cash in the bank, and accounts receivable at all times 
in a sum total greater than or equal to $60,000.00. As defendant 
continued to violate these provisions, it became obvious to the 
plaintiff that the contract would no longer afford him the reasonable 
prot12ction he deserved, and he was left with seeking protection from 
~e courts. He had to act to protect his property and financial 
interests, an action recognized by the Utah Supreme Court as being 
fully justified. In Soter v. Wasatch Development Corp., 21 Utah 2d 
224, 443 P.2d 663 (1968) plaintiff was a mortgagor whose payments 
on the mortgage to defendant were seriously in arrears. Defendants 
kept making demands on the plaintiffs for payments of past due 
arrearage and even granted a reduction in the amount due and an 
extension of time in which to pay it. But even during this extension 
plaintiff continued in default on the payments, until, when the 
situation be0an to seriously threaten defendants' financial interests, 
they demanded the property back. The plaintiffs then sued, contending 
that the defcnJants had interferred with their contract by not 
oooperating with them to obtain new financing and had spoiled their 
deal with the Wasatch Dt·'Velopment Corporation, a finance company. 
The Court said that "In order to establish a right to recover on 
such a cause of actio11 the plaintiffs would have to show that the 
-<1-
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defendants, without justification, by some wrongful and malicious 
act, interferred with the plaintiff's right of contract, and that 
actual damage resulted." 433 P.2d at 664. The Court then goes on 
to explain why such a privilege is justified: 
In addition to the fact that . [plaintiffs] 
were aware of and apparently approving (de[endants'] 
negotiations with Wasatch, the [defendants] had a legi-
timate interest in seeing what was being done about 
their property and in seeing that someone who was 
willing and able should become responsible for paying 
out the contract.. (I]f a party has an interest 
to protect, he is privileged to prevent performance 
of a contract which threatens it. The (plaintiffs] 
had long been in default, and had not remedied the 
same during a six-month extension granted them, nor 
in an additional two months. 
* * * 
It is our opinion that the trial court was justified 
in granting the defendants . . . Motion to Dismiss 
because the undisputed facts shown preclude any 
reasonable possibility that the Soters could make 
out a cause of action for wrongful interference 
with a contractual relationship between the Soters 
and Wasatch Development Corp. Id. at 665. 
Thus, al though discussed in Soter as regarding an interferring 
third party, interference is justified if it is for the proteclion 
of financial or property interests. Such a justification includM 
the bringing of a suit to protect the financial interests involved. 
As stated by Prosser: 
If [defendant] has a present, existing economic 
interest to protect, such as the ownership or condi-
tion of property, or a prior contract of his own, or 
a financial interest in the affairs of the person 
persuaded, he is privileged to prevent performance of 
the contract of another which threatens it, and for. 
obvious reasons of policy (a defendant] is likewise 
privileged to assert an honest claim, or bring or 
threaten a suit in good faith. . Prosser §129, 
at 944-945. 
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In spite of this, defendant Isom claims that the filing of the 
lawsuit by the plaintiff was the precipitating factor which forced 
him to close the doors of the business. Such a claim, however, 
cannot be seriously maintained when in fact the decision to close the 
doors and file bankruptcy was defendant's alone. At trial, defendant 
admitted it was his decision alone to shut down the business. 
---
Q: Let's talk about your business ceasing to operate. 
When did you close the doors of Richard's Fine 
Furnishings? 
A: Upon service of the Complaint date I think it was 
March 11th. 
Q: March 11th, the decision to close the doors of Richard's 
Fine Furnishings was yours only, was it not? 
A: Well, I read in the statement --
Q: No, I'm just asking whose decision it was to close the 
doors? 
A: It was my decision. 
* * * 
Q: The decision to close the doors of Richard's Fine 
Furnishings on March 11th of 1975 was whose? 
A: Was mine. 
Q: Were you ordered by any court to close your doors? 
A: Not at that time. 
Q: Were you asked by any officer or director or agent of 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company to close your doors? 
A: I'd say the document speaks for itself. 
Q: I'm just asking you did you have any personal contact 
or did they tell you to close your doors? 
A: No. No. 
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Q: The decision was yours? 
A: Yes. (Tr. pp. 422-423) 
Thus, plaintiff's good faith assertion in court of his honest 
claim had no real impact at all on defendant's decision to close de 
the business. The decision was his and his alone, and he cannot~ 
foist responsibility for ~hat decision onto the plaintiff. 
It is obvious that plaintiff Leigh was merely attempting to 
protect his own financial and property interests, a purpose for whL, 
the lease proved futile because of defendant's persistent violatio;: 
thereof. Plaintiff was left with no other remedy than that providE. 
by the courts. Public policy is certainly against taking "self-he!:. 
remedial measures, and plaintiff was thus effectively left with no 
other means by which redress could be obtained. Indeed, the social 
desirability of being allowed to assert an honest claim in the coor 
for the protection of individual rights is paramount to any private 
desires to let injustices go uncorrected. The plaintiff was meu~I 
I 
exercising that right in good faith. In fact his right to do sow;:-
recognized by the court in its initial granting of an injunctionw 
joining defendant's continuance of the business without an audit be;! 
taken. The court thus recognized the social desirability of plaint· 
right to utilize the courts in good faith for protection. As statE:j 
..I 
by the Alaska Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service v. Auro~ 
I 
Service, 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1979), "One is privileged to inva~ 
the contractual interest of himself, others, or the public, if t~ 
interest advanced by him is superior in social importance to the 
interest intended." Id. at 1094. 
-34-
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The i11tcrest which plaintiff sought to invade by bringing suit 
against defc11dant was merely defendant's interest in continued 
violation of the lease. The invasion of that unjustified interest 
was plaintiff's predominate purpose. In no other way could be 
obtain a remedy. This court is now respectfully requested to 
recognize that remedy and to overturn the trial court's decision 
which left plaintiff helpless. Plaintiff acted in good faith and 
his predominate purpose, as in Soter, was merely to protect his 
financial interests. His actions taken to protect such interests 
were thus justified and constitute a privilege for plaintiff to 
"interfere" with defendant's "contractual or business relations." 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the trial court's judgment in 
favor of defendant must be overturned or, in the alternative, 
plaintiff should be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of January, 1981. 
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
By~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Gary R. Howe 
W. Clark Burt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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